Introduction to International Relations: Lectures 4-6 - Theory, Part #1: The Constraints and Incentives of Anarchy
The Constraints and Incentives of Anarchy
Jervis and the Security Dilemma
- Starting point for realism: structure
- anarchy vs hierarchy
- Anarchy leads to:
- War is always possible
- Self-help (aka, sort of, functional similarity)
- Concerns for Relative Gains
- security dilemma
- Collective action problems
- tragedy of the commons
What is the security dilemma?
The dilemma: "An increase in one state's security decreases the security of others."
Anarchy → Fears → Security dilemma
Security dilemma is: ↑ My security = ↓ Your security
Security dilemma → Arms Races, Security Spirals
↑ Offense Dominance → ↑ Arms Races, Security Spirals (and vice versa with defense dominance)
↑ Offense Dominance → ↑ Instability (and vice versa with defense dominance)
Often only means weapons, but I think it also describes a general level of fear and threat assessment
Manipulating the severity of the security dilemma:
- The Offense/Defense Balance
- Influences on the Balance
Jervis, Deterrence and Spiral:
Two strategies for dealing threats and enemies
- When threatened do you deter or appease?
- Deterrence
- capability
- resolve
- communication
- rationality
- Costs of Deterrence = spirals
- security dilemma
- How to Choose?
- How to Choose?
- Deterrence Model:
- ⇑ Strength
→ Back Down (Prevent War)
- Spiral Model:
- ⇑ Strength
→ Rear Up (Arms Races, Security Spirals)
⇑
⇓
↑
↓
|
Reward |
Risk |
Deter (sometimes similar to balancing)
|
Deterrence works: no war |
Backfires: leads to spiral, arms race, tension |
Appease (or despiral) (sometimes similar to bandwagoning)
|
Appeasement works: no war |
Fails: whets appetite of aggressor, so not just war, but war against stronger adversary |
- Continuum of non-balancing policies:
- Bandwagon ↔ Appease ↔ Despiral
- Continuum of balancing policies:
- Pre-empt ↔ Misc. denial ↔ Build up/Ally w\others
Jervis, Hypotheses on Misperception
- How does psychology influence decision-making?
- Newtonian Psychology hypothesis
- pre-Copernican Psychology
- Bowling Shoe hypothesis
- How do these relate to other theories?
Walt and Balance of Threat
- Question: Where do friends and alliances come from?
- Answer: Balancing against threats.
- vs. bandwagoning
- any other options/strategies?
- Four components of (influences on) threat are:
- aggregate power
- geography
- offensive power
- intentions
- Note competing explanations and structure of argument
- Note policy implications
Ostrom
- Three problems that hinder cooperation, all caused or exacerbated by anarchy:
- Tragedy of the Commons
- Prisoners’ Dilemma
- Collective Action Problems
- How can one fix these problems? (for future classes)
- Hints: enforcement, communication, reciprocity, shadow of the future/concern for reputation.
Prisoner's Dilemma
|
Prisoner # 1 Silent
|
Prisoner # 1 Confess
|
Prisoner#2 Silent
|
-1
-1
|
-25
-15
|
Prisoner#2 Confess |
-15
-25
|
-10
-10 |
C=Cooperate
D=Defect
| CC: |
Both silent, nailed on minor charge, both get 1 year in jail |
DC, CD:
|
One confesses (rats), the other silent. Silent guy is major league evil, gets 15 years. Rat gets time served. |
| DD: |
Both rat, both pretty evil, both get 10 years. |
Game highlights basic incentives to cheat given certain assumptions: bad guys that can not talk to each other. One shot iteration.
Fisherperson’s Dilemma
|
Fisher # 1 Cooperate
|
Fisher # 1 Cheat
|
Fisher #2 Cooperate |
+5
+5
|
+10
-5
|
Fisher #2 Cheat |
-5
+10
|
-15
-15 |
C=Cooperate
D=Defect
| CC: |
Both gain and pre-crisis stocks are eventually restored. |
| CD, DC: |
One gaining twice and one losing from cheating and thinning fish
|
| DD: |
Both losing everything from no fish, having to use savings to look for job, etc. |
Game highlights Common Goods/Tragedy of the Commons Problems (CPRs common pooled resources)
Also relevant: Stag Hunt
Review of Realism
- The consequences of anarchy
- Focus on power and the possibility of war
- Influence of the distribution of capabilities on state behavior
Questions for next section:
How much anarchy is there? How can it be mitigated?
Citation: Lindley, D. (2011, January 21). Lectures 4-6. Retrieved May 25, 2013, from Notre Dame OpenCourseWare Web site: http://ocw.nd.edu/political-science/introduction-to-international-relations/lectures/lecture-4.
Copyright 2012,
by the Contributing Authors.
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Creative Commons License.