Lecture 14 Notes

Refining Happiness and the Background to Law

 

Plan of the Lecture

I.    Aquinas on Happiness: Question 2
II.   Aquinas on Happiness: Question 3
III.  Background to Law

I.    Aquinas on Happiness: Question 2

A.   Refinements

B.   Question II, Article 5.  Whether happiness consists in bodily goods?

  • First Argument: our end cannot be self-preservation. 
  • Second Argument:
  1. Suppose, for the sake of argument, our end is the preservation of being.
  2. Being consists in body and soul, obviously.
  3. The body depends on the soul, which we previously proved.
  4. ...is for its sake "as matter for its form, and the instruments for the man that puts them in motion" (FROM (iii))
  5. "Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the goods of the soul, as to their end."  So: happiness, which is the ultimate end, is not a bodily good.
  • Question II: Article 6.  Whether happiness consists in pleasure?  Aquinas begins with a distinction: other delights vs. bodily pleasure.
  • FIRST ARGUMENT: Happiness is not these other delights, e.g. intellectual pleasure, joy of discovery
  1. "the reason a man is delighted is that he has some fitting good"
  2. "Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the perfect good is precisely man’s happiness; and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness"
  3. So delight "result[s] from happiness or some part of happiness".
  4. So, delight cannot be happiness.
  • SECOND ARGUMENT: Not only is happiness not bodily pleasure, it cannot even be natural result of happiness.
  1. Bodily pleasure is "from a good apprehended by sense" .
  2. Sense "makes use of the body", obviously.
  3. "The rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter", obviously.
  4. So "that part of the soul which is independent of corporeal matter has a certain infinity in regard to the body".
  5. "Therefore sense knows the singular, which is determinate through matter, whereas the intellect knows the universal, which ... contains an infinite number of singulars."
  6. Therefore, the good which is apprehended by sense is less than good apprehended by the intellect.
  7. "...it is evident that good which .. causes bodily delight through being apprehended by sense, is not man’s perfect good, but is a trifle compared with good of soul".  So, bodily pleasure is not a natural result of highest good, happiness.
  • REMARKS ON THE ARGUMENT:
  1. It is necessary to argue that happiness does not depend on body.  The problems here are that bodily pleasures are so attractive to us, they can lead us astray, and they can distract us from what is really important.
  2. This is a claim that Aquinas needs to support later claims about personal immortality.
  3. It reveals important claims about capacity of mind: its capacity is "infinite" in comparison w/ sensation.  It is capable of grasping the abstract, grasping what is independent of matter.  It is also capable of grasping such a thing that naturally results in delight: the “Eureka!” feeling.

II.   Aquinas on Happiness: Question 3: Article 8: Does Happiness Consist in Vision of Divine Essence?

  1. "The object of the intellect is what a things is, i.e. the essence of the thing"
  2. "The perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object"
  3. "Wherefore the intellect attains perfection insofar as it knows the essence of a thing" (FROM (1) AND (2))
  4. "When we know an effect, and know that it has a cause there remains the desire to know about the cause what it is" -- i.e. to know the essence of the cause
  5. "Man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek."
  6. "If the human intellect, knowing some created effect [of God] knows no more of God than that He is there remains desire"
  7. "Wherefore it is not perfectly happy" (FROM (4),(5) AND (6))
  8. THEREFORE "for perfect happiness, the intellect needs to reach the very essence of the First Cause".

III.   Background to Law

A.   Introduction

  1. ...what makes actions voluntary and involuntary.
  2. ...what faculties are involved in human actions.
  3. ...what makes human action good or bad.
  4. ...virtues in which good human life consists.

B.    Recall several important points we made when talking about Plato and Aristotle:

C.    Some Similarities Between the Ancients and Aquinas

D.    Two Important Differences

  1. In virtue of being here, we have a relationship with other Notre Dame people as such, and only with them.
  2. The quality of that relationship depends on health of institution, whether it is achieving its goals of providing good education, good dorm life, and so on.
  3. Whether institution does well, e.g., achieves its goals, depends on what the members do.  Their working together to realize goals itself builds relationships.
  4. The well-being of institutions, and of relationships in institutional life, is itself an important element of the happiness of members, as well as an important element of their living good life.
  1. Each of which has a common good: political society aims at justice, peace, moral virtue of members.  Humanity aims at flourishing of human beings.  Catholic Christendom aims at salvation.  The created universe reflects various aspects of God’s glory.  The "city of God" aims to praise, glorify, and contemplate God.
  2. Whether each achieves its good depends on the commitments and collective activities of members.
  3. When each community achieves common good, it perfects the relations among members, including the friendshipo relation.  Thus, friendship + flourishing of community are important elements of members’ good.

E.    This suggests a very complicated picture of human happiness:

 

 

 

Citation: Weithman, P. (2006, September 19). Lecture 14 Notes. Retrieved November 23, 2009, from Notre Dame OpenCourseWare Web site: http://ocw.nd.edu/philosophy/introduction-to-philosophy/lectures/lecture-14-notes.
Copyright 2009, by the Contributing Authors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License. Creative Commons License