Lecture 02 Notes

Reading a Platonic Dialogue

 

Lecture Plan
I.   Shakespeare as a Model
II.  Excerpt of the Republic
III. Reading this Excerpt Philosophically

I.  Shakespeare as a Model

Consider the following excerpt from Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, Act I, Scene II:

Caesar:     Calpurnia!

Casca:       Peace, ho! Caesar speaks.

Caesar:     Calpurnia!

Calpurnia:  Here, my lord.

Caesar:    Stand you directly in Antonius’ way,
                When he doth run his course.  Antonius!

Antony:     Caesar, my lord?

Caesar:    Forget not, in your speed, Antonius,
                To touch Calpurnia, for our elders say,
                The barren, touched in this holy chase,
                Shake off their sterile curse.

Antony:    I shall remember.
                When Caesar says “do this”, it is perform’d.

Caesar:     Set on; and leave no ceremony out.

Soothsayer: Caesar!

Caesar:    Who is it in this press that calls on me?
                I hear a tongue, shriller than all the music,
                Cry “Caesar!” Speak; Caesar is turn’d to hear.

Soothsayer: Beware the Ides of March.

 

 

In order to understand this exchange, what should you look for?

 

II.  An Excerpt from The Republic

 

...we must first enquire whether what you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice is interest of some sort, but you go on to say 'of the stronger'; about this addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further.

Proceed.
I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just or subjects to obey their rulers?

I do.
But are the rulers of states absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes liable to err?

To be sure, he replied, they are liable to err.
Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes not?

True.
When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest; when they are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit that?

Yes.
And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects, --and that is what you call justice?

Doubtless.
Then justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger but the reverse?

What is that you are saying? he asked.
I am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider: Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has not that been admitted?

Yes.
Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest of the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done which are to their own injury. For if, as you say, justice is the obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury of the stronger?

Nothing can be clearer, Socrates, said Polemarchus.

Plato, The Republic, 339b-339e

 

A.  In order to understand this exchange, what should you look for?

B.  What shouldn’t you do?

REMEMBER: You learn to read and write one way in English class, another in philosophy!

 

III.  Reading this Excerpt Philosophically

 

A.  What to Look For

B.  A Closer Look

 

...we must first enquire whether what you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice is interest of some sort, but you go on to say (1) [justice is in the interest] 'of the stronger'; about this addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further.

Proceed.
I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that (2) it is just or subjects to obey their rulers?

I do.
But are the rulers of states absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes liable to err?

To be sure, he replied, (3) they are liable to err.
Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes not?

True.
(4) When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest; when they are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit that?

Yes.
And (5) the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects, --and that is what you call justice?

Doubtless.
Then (6) justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger but the reverse?

What is that you are saying? he asked.
I am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider: Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has not that been admitted?

Yes.
Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest of the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done which are to their own injury. For if, as you say, justice is the obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury of the stronger?

Nothing can be clearer, Socrates, said Polemarchus.

 

Plato, The Republic, 339b-339e

 

C.  Socrates' Argument Against Thrasymachus

Suppose, as Thrasymachus says, that

    (1) Justice is whatever is in the interest of the strongest party.

So it follows that:

    (2) Obedience to the government is always right.

Thrasymachus agrees that

    (3) Governments are capable of error when it comes to legislation,

and that

    (4) When they get it wrong, the laws will be to their disadvantage.

Thrasymachus also insists that

    (5) Subjects must obey any law that is passed.

But now Thrasymachus is in a dilemma, for:

    (6) Suppose subjects don’t follow a misconceived law.

Then it follows from (5) that

    (7) They do something wrong.

So instead of (6)

    (8) Suppose the subjects obey the misconceived law.

Since the law is misconceived, it enjoins subjects to do something that is NOT in the interest of those in power.  So from (8) it follows that

    (9) Citizens act against the interest of the strongest

So from Thrasymachus’s definition of justice, it follows that

    (10) Citizens do something wrong.

 

CONCLUSION: It is no more right to act to the advantage of the stronger party than to do the opposite.  Thus, THRASYMACHUS LOSES! (The problem stems from his concession at (3).)

Thrasymachus replies by modifying his claim: Morality is whatever is in the interest of the ruling party, WHEN THEY MAKE NO MISTAKES ABOUT WHAT IS IN THEIR INTEREST.

 

Consider for next time:

 

 

 

Citation: Weithman, P. (2006, September 19). Lecture 02 Notes. Retrieved November 23, 2009, from Notre Dame OpenCourseWare Web site: http://ocw.nd.edu/philosophy/introduction-to-philosophy/lectures/lecture-02-notes.
Copyright 2009, by the Contributing Authors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License. Creative Commons License