Lecture 04 Notes

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Ontological Argument - Objections and Replies

Review: The Ontological Argument

God Exists In The Understanding
God Is A Possible Being
If Something Exists Only In The Understanding And Could Have Existed In Reality, Then It Could Have Been Greater Than It Is
Suppose God Exists Only In The Understanding
Then God Might Have Been Greater Than He Actually Is
God Is A Being Than Which A Greater Is Possible
The Being Than Which No Greater Is Possible Is A Being Than Which A Greater Is Possible
It Must Be False That God Exists Only In The Understanding
Therefore, God Exists In Reality As Well As Understanding

Objections to The Ontological Argument

Gaunilo's Objection
1. The Objection: The Argument is Too Strong
  - The same sort of argument could prove that "the x than which no greater is possible" exists for any x.
  - Ex. The Perfect Island = the island than which no greater is possible. If you substitute "The Perfect Island" for "God" and "the island than which no greater is possible" for "the being than which no greater is possible" in the argument, you will have an argument for the existence of the perfect island. But, of course, no such island exists.
2. First Reply: The Argument Concerns Only Things in General, Not Specific Things Like Islands
  - Response on Behalf of Gaunilo--This seems ad hoc. Why can't specific things have the argument applied to them?
3. Second Reply: Fully Perfect Island not Possible
  - This is an extension of the first reply. The reason the argument does not apply to specific things (like islands) is that, in being specific things they must lack perfections (e.g., omnipotence).
  - Response on Behalf of Gaunilo--But what about a semi-perfect island?!? Could the argument be used to prove that an island that has all of the perfections that specific things could have must exist?
  - Gaunilo's Response--Of course no island can be omnipotent. But the concept of a perfect island only includes the perfections that are appropriate to an island. Moreover, existence in reality is a perfection an island could have. Thus, Anselm's argument could still be used to prove that there must exist an island that has all of the perfections that are appropriate to an island.
Kant's Objection
1. The Objection: Existence is Not a Predicate
  - Attacks premise (3)--Premise (3) claims that having the property (predicate) of existence makes a being greater. But if existence isn't a property (predicate), then having it would not make a being greater.
  - Kant argues that existence is not a predicate because just by making a statement about something, we presuppose the thing to exist.
2. Reply: Many Statements Clearly Don't Presuppose Existence
  - Ex. A statement about a mythical being does not presuppose that the mythical being exists.
Possibility Objection
1. The Objection: Anselm's God is Not Possible
  - Attacks premise (2).
  - Maybe beings are like integers--there is no greatest one.
2. Reply: Perhaps God is Like Angles, Not Integers
  - We can't say one way or the other.
  - Since we can't say one way or the other, we should be charitable to Anselm.
Rowe's Objection
1. The Objection: We Must Distinguish Between Talking About Properties Which Make Up a Concept and Talking About Whether a Concept is Instantiated
2. Example: Magico vs. Magican
  - Magico = a non-existing magician
  - Magican = an existing magician
  - Rowe notes that no non-existing thing will qualify as a magican. But that does not show that there are any magicans.
3. Crux Point: Anselm Shows That No Non-Existent Being Would Qualify as God; Not That God Actually Exists
  - In this way, the concept of God is like the concept of the magican; it includes existence.
  - But the fact that these concepts include existence does not prove that these concepts are instantiated.
Further Consideration--Is it really OK to view existence and non-existence as properties?
1. Metaphysical Worries About Rowe's Analysis
  - Rowe's Objection does allow for existence as a property; this seems questionable.
2. Use-Mention Errors
  - A use-mention error occurs when you confuse the representation (mention) with the thing represented (use).
  - Ex. (1) Boston has busy streets. (2) Boston has 6 letters. In (1), we use the word Boston; the word is intended to represent the city. In (2), we mention the word Boston; the subject of the sentence is the representation not what is represented.
  - Anselm's argument seems to use something like a use-mention error. When Anselm talks about God existing in the understanding, and God existing in reality, it looks like he is talking about God in both cases. But when talking about God in the understanding, we are really talking about our idea or concept of God -- our mental representation of God. So we wind up comparing two very different things.
3. Constructing a New Analysis With Proper Terminology (replacing "God in the understanding" with "a concept of God")
  1. We have a concept of God.
  2. That concept could correspond to something real.
  3. If we have a concept of something that doesn't correspond to something real and could have, then that concept could have been greater than it is. (???)
  4. Suppose our concept of God doesn't correspond to something real. (reductio premise)
  5. Then our concept of God might have been greater than it actually is. (i, ii, iii, & iv)
  6. Our concept of God is a concept than which a greater is possible. (v)
  7. Our concept of the being than which no greater is possible is a concept than which a greater is possible. (vi, def. of God--contradiction???)
  8. Our concept of God doesn't correspond to something real is false. (deny reductio premise???)
  9. Therefore, our concept of God corresponds with something real. (i & viii)
4. The New Analysis seems to have a false premise (iii) and the contradiction isn't clear in (vii).

Copyright 2008, by the Contributing Authors. Cite/attribute Resource. administrator. (2006, September 19). Lecture 04 Notes. Retrieved September 08, 2008, from Notre Dame OpenCourseWare Web site: http://ocw.nd.edu/philosophy/introduction-to-philosophy-2/Lecture%2004%20Notes.html. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License.

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	Info Lecture 04 Notes Document Actions — filed under: Introduction to Philosophy, Philosophy Ontological Argument - Objections and Replies Review: The Ontological Argument God Exists In The Understanding God Is A Possible Being If Something Exists Only In The Understanding And Could Have Existed In Reality, Then It Could Have Been Greater Than It Is Suppose God Exists Only In The Understanding Then God Might Have Been Greater Than He Actually Is God Is A Being Than Which A Greater Is Possible The Being Than Which No Greater Is Possible Is A Being Than Which A Greater Is Possible It Must Be False That God Exists Only In The Understanding Therefore, God Exists In Reality As Well As Understanding Objections to The Ontological Argument Gaunilo's Objection The Objection: The Argument is Too Strong The same sort of argument could prove that "the x than which no greater is possible" exists for any x. Ex. The Perfect Island = the island than which no greater is possible. If you substitute "The Perfect Island" for "God" and "the island than which no greater is possible" for "the being than which no greater is possible" in the argument, you will have an argument for the existence of the perfect island. But, of course, no such island exists. First Reply: The Argument Concerns Only Things in General, Not Specific Things Like Islands Response on Behalf of Gaunilo--This seems ad hoc. Why can't specific things have the argument applied to them? Second Reply: Fully Perfect Island not Possible This is an extension of the first reply. The reason the argument does not apply to specific things (like islands) is that, in being specific things they must lack perfections (e.g., omnipotence). Response on Behalf of Gaunilo--But what about a semi-perfect island?!? Could the argument be used to prove that an island that has all of the perfections that specific things could have must exist? Gaunilo's Response--Of course no island can be omnipotent. But the concept of a perfect island only includes the perfections that are appropriate to an island. Moreover, existence in reality is a perfection an island could have. Thus, Anselm's argument could still be used to prove that there must exist an island that has all of the perfections that are appropriate to an island. Kant's Objection The Objection: Existence is Not a Predicate Attacks premise (3)--Premise (3) claims that having the property (predicate) of existence makes a being greater. But if existence isn't a property (predicate), then having it would not make a being greater. Kant argues that existence is not a predicate because just by making a statement about something, we presuppose the thing to exist. Reply: Many Statements Clearly Don't Presuppose Existence Ex. A statement about a mythical being does not presuppose that the mythical being exists. Possibility Objection The Objection: Anselm's God is Not Possible Attacks premise (2). Maybe beings are like integers--there is no greatest one. Reply: Perhaps God is Like Angles, Not Integers We can't say one way or the other. Since we can't say one way or the other, we should be charitable to Anselm. Rowe's Objection The Objection: We Must Distinguish Between Talking About Properties Which Make Up a Concept and Talking About Whether a Concept is Instantiated Example: Magico vs. Magican Magico = a non-existing magician Magican = an existing magician Rowe notes that no non-existing thing will qualify as a magican. But that does not show that there are any magicans. Crux Point: Anselm Shows That No Non-Existent Being Would Qualify as God; Not That God Actually Exists In this way, the concept of God is like the concept of the magican; it includes existence. But the fact that these concepts include existence does not prove that these concepts are instantiated. Further Consideration--Is it really OK to view existence and non-existence as properties? Metaphysical Worries About Rowe's Analysis Rowe's Objection does allow for existence as a property; this seems questionable. Use-Mention Errors A use-mention error occurs when you confuse the representation (mention) with the thing represented (use). Ex. (1) Boston has busy streets. (2) Boston has 6 letters. In (1), we use the word Boston; the word is intended to represent the city. In (2), we mention the word Boston; the subject of the sentence is the representation not what is represented. Anselm's argument seems to use something like a use-mention error. When Anselm talks about God existing in the understanding, and God existing in reality, it looks like he is talking about God in both cases. But when talking about God in the understanding, we are really talking about our idea or concept of God -- our mental representation of God. So we wind up comparing two very different things. Constructing a New Analysis With Proper Terminology (replacing "God in the understanding" with "a concept of God") We have a concept of God. That concept could correspond to something real. If we have a concept of something that doesn't correspond to something real and could have, then that concept could have been greater than it is. (???) Suppose our concept of God doesn't correspond to something real. (reductio premise) Then our concept of God might have been greater than it actually is. (i, ii, iii, & iv) Our concept of God is a concept than which a greater is possible. (v) Our concept of the being than which no greater is possible is a concept than which a greater is possible. (vi, def. of God--contradiction???) Our concept of God doesn't correspond to something real is false. (deny reductio premise???) Therefore, our concept of God corresponds with something real. (i & viii) The New Analysis seems to have a false premise (iii) and the contradiction isn't clear in (vii). Copyright 2008, by the Contributing Authors. Cite/attribute Resource. administrator. (2006, September 19). Lecture 04 Notes. Retrieved September 08, 2008, from Notre Dame OpenCourseWare Web site: http://ocw.nd.edu/philosophy/introduction-to-philosophy-2/Lecture%2004%20Notes.html. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License.	Reuse Course Download this course or reuse in OpenOCW. Download this course Export into OpenOCW

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