Lecture 16 Notes

Review: Compatibilism

    1. Freedom and determinism are compatible.  We are both free and determined.
    2. Freedom = Moral Freedom (the ability to do what you want).

 

Problems with Compatibilism

    1. Strategy for Challenging Compatibilism--Attack the idea that doing what you want is sufficient for freedom by giving cases where a person is doing what she wants but intuitively isn't free.  In other words, give counterexamples to the compatibilist's account of freedom.
    2. Type 1 Counterexamples: Manipulative Neuroscientist/Hypnotist/Brainwasher
      1. Suppose that there is a manipulative neuroscientist that gives you the desire to cheat on an exam.  If you were to then cheat on the exam, you might be acting according to your desire but you would not be free since you had no control over what you desire.
      2. Patty Hearst Case--Patty Hearst was abducted and brainwashed.  She was later found in the act of robbery; an action that she would not have done prior to being brainwashed.  But, presumably, at the time she desired to commit this act of robbery.  So, again, we have an example of an action that is in accord with an agent's desires but we would not consider it free.
    3. Type 2 Counterexamples (Locke's Room Example)
      1. Being Free vs. Being Lucky--The compatibilist account of freedom seems to mistake being lucky for being free in cases where you are compelled to do something that you luckily want to do.
      2. Ex. Imagine that a Notre Dame sports fan and a Michigan sports fan are going out one night.  They find themselves in a bar filled with Notre Dame fans watching classic Notre Dame victories over Michigan.  The Notre Dame fan desires to stay; what could be better than watching the Irish beat the Wolverines?!?  The Michigan fan desires to leave but finds that he is locked in the bar.  So according to the compatibilist's account of freedom, the Notre Dame fan is free (he has the ability to do what he wants), but the Michigan fan is not (he lacks the ability to do what he wants).  But this is absurd--wouldn't we want to say that neither of them is free, the Notre Dame fan is just luckier than the Michigan fan?
    4. Key Point: We Can Do What We Want and Not Be Free!

 

The Hard Determinism vs. Compatibilism Debate

    1. Hard Determinist: Free acts require the ability to do otherwise; we don't have that, so we aren't free.
    2. Compatibilist: No, your analysis of freedom is mistaken; freedom only requires that we do what we want.  We often do this, so we are free.
    3. Hard Determinist: No, YOUR analysis of freedom is mistaken since there are cases where people do what they want, but cleraly are not free (i.e., brainwashing, etc.)
    4. Compatibilist: Wait, those cases don't count as counterexamples to our analysis of freedom since in those cases, the person isn't reallly acting on her own wants; instead, the wants have been installed by outside forces.
    5. Hard Determinist: Oh yea?  Well, if determinism is true, everyone's wants and beliefs are installed by outside forces--what's the relevant difference between brain-washing and ordinary childhood?
    6. Compatibilist: Oh yea?  Well, your mother...

 

Citation: Ramsey, W. (2006, September 19). Lecture 16 Notes. Retrieved November 23, 2009, from Notre Dame OpenCourseWare Web site: http://ocw.nd.edu/philosophy/introduction-to-philosophy-1/lectures/lecture-16-notes.
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