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Lecture 09 Notes

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The Mind-Body Problem

    1. An Inconsistent Tetrad
      1. Mind is non-material (spiritual).
      2. Body is material (physical).
      3. Mind and body interact.
      4. Material and non-material do not interact.
    2. Possible Solutions: Dualism and the Varieties of Materialism

 

Two Types of Dualism

    1. First Type: Substance Dualism: 2 Kinds
      1. Interactionism (Descartes, Popular View)
        • Mind and body are made up of different kinds of stuff.
        • The mind is made up of thinking stuff (immaterial) and the body is made up of extended stuff (material).
        • Mind and body interact.  Big Problem: How???
      2. Parallelism (Leibniz)
        • Mind and body are made up of different kinds of stuff.
        • The mind is made up of thinking stuff (immaterial) and the body is made up of extended stuff (material).
        • Mind and body do not interact but are on a parallel course.  The appearance of interaction is just a pre-established harmony that God orchestrates. 
    2. Second Type: Property Dualism
      1. Certain mental states have "irreducible properties"; as a result, certain mental states cannot be reduced to physical states.
        • Reducibility vs. Irreducibility--Reduction does not mean making something smaller.  A is reducible to B means either A is identical to B or A can be entirely explained in terms of B.
        • Reducibility--Something materialists (physicalists) claim about the nature of mental states.  It says mental states are in some sense identical to brain states.  It provides support for materialism.
        • Irreducibility--Something dualists claim about the nature of mental states.  It says mental states do not equal brain states because of one or more of the special features.  It provides support for dualism.
      2. What sorts of properties are thought to be irreducible?
        • Qualitative Properties: Raw Feels.  Qualia states such as pains, tickles, etc. have qualitative properties and thus are thought to be irreducible to physical states.
        • Intentional: Aboutness, Truth and Falsehood.  Propositional attitude states such as beliefs, desires, etc. have intentionality and truth and falsity and thus are thought to be irreducible to physical states.
      3. Deep Worry: Epiphenomenalism
        • Epiphenomenalism--A radical view about the causal role of mental states.  It says they do absolutely nothing.  It is a consequence of property dualism.
        • This is a deep worry because it seems obvious that our qualia states and our propositional attitude states do have influence on our physical states.  Ex.  The pain in my leg causes me to shout "Ouch!"
Copyright 2009, by the Contributing Authors. Cite/attribute Resource. Ramsey, W. (2006, September 19). Lecture 09 Notes. Retrieved November 23, 2009, from Notre Dame OpenCourseWare Web site: http://ocw.nd.edu/philosophy/introduction-to-philosophy-1/lectures/lecture-09-notes. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License. Creative Commons License