United Nations and Terrorism

Can the United Nations do anything about global terrorism?

Should it do anything?

The Problems and Debates when talking about the United Nations

• The debate about what the UN is and what it is not – the creature of the nation states.
• The debate about the purpose of the UN being able to preserve peace and security and enhance the human condition – not join a war offered by a few states.
• The problem that the UN structurally is a number of varied bodies, some of which are more autonomous than others: General Assembly (GA), Security Council (SC), Secretary General (SG), many agencies (WHO, UNESCO, WB) and ‘programs’ (UNHCR, UNDP) and funds (UNICEF; UNFPA)

Historically…

• The UN has a bad track record in dealing with terrorism – definitional impasse, Israeli- Palestinian issues, etc.
• The UN-US rift (UNAUSA; Bennis; Malone)
• The contemporary dilemma of UN ‘scandals’ of leadership, the Oil-for-Food program (UN; Inquiry Report; Oil-for-Food Facts; UNAUSA), and sex scandals (Congo; Bosnia; Liberia)

First, what are the aims of global counter-terrorist policies?

• Destroy networks, cells, leadership thru law enforcement, military means, legal and diplomatic
• Deny assets and resources thru law enforcement, legal, diplomatic and economic means
• Diminish underlying causes & conditions thru economic, legal, political and social means

How has the UN responded to the aims of counter-terror policies:

Security Council in the Lead

• Security Council and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) addressing air piracy, hijacking and air security treaties and codes, (1968–1990).
• SC leads UN support for Vienna Conventions on the Protection of Diplomats (1977).
• In the 1990s, strong Security Council Resolutions (SCRs) imposing sanctions on Libya (1992; 1993), Sudan (1996: 1044; 1054; 1070) and Afghanistan (1999; 2000) for their direct support of terrorism.
• Resource: Anti-Terrorism Conventions

Security Council Resolutions

• SCR 1267 (Oct. 15, 1999)
• the ‘Taliban’ resolution which demands extradition of Osama bin Laden
• Imposes strict, smart sanctions on assets, travel of leaders; has major humanitarian provisions
• Creates the 1267 Committee

Effects of UNSC sanctions

• By 2003, Libya and Sudan are considered ‘success stories’ as they renounce terrorist ties and improve other behaviors related to terrorism (weapons issues, etc).
• But it is clear that such changed behavior results when the ‘sticks’ used by the SC are enhanced by the ‘carrots’ provided by single member states.

UN’s Response to 9-11

• SCR 1373 (9/28) – unprecedented in its scope of demands on states (see list)
• 1373 creates the UN Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC), with British Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock as its 1st chair.
• Organizations such as the Center on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation have helped with research and policy development
• In its first 27 months great success in getting nations to sign on to eleven key counter-terrorism treaties and in:

Universal counter-terrorism treaties

• State self-reporting with regard to compliance…
• 1 report:  196 nations
• 2 reports: 161 nations
• 3 reports: 107 nations
• 4 reports:   26 nations
• Convention and treaty ratification improves
• Counter-Terror Legislative Assistance:
• 52 receive general assistance;
• 27 specific
• 147 nations request some assistance and/or training in one or more of these areas:
• Police and law enforcement
• Immigration and border control
• Banking issues and supervision
• Fraud documentation and control in various areas from immigration, travel, finances

What does all of this mean?

• The CTC and the UN are at their most effective when they
1. form and hold up to all states what the standards of behavior need to be;
2. provide a ‘switchboard’ role in connecting those in need of service with the ones who can provide the expertise for that service;
3. report, counsel and hold compliant those states not meeting the standards

The surprises in the system

• The pervasive need for technical assistance in varied areas
• The tensions between advanced states and regional organizations in identifying recalcitrant states and the work of the CTC, thus SCRs 1456 (Jan 03), 1526 (Jan 04) 
• The progress of existing organizations and their capacity as underused….thus the CTC as a ‘switchboard’
• Further the human rights agenda of the CT efforts
• Work to sponsor new international meetings on smaller critical issues on which states can make progress – most especially at the regional level (i.e. Asia).
• Work with various actors on enhancing ‘compliance’ – especially the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODOC)

To ‘reinvigorate’ the CTC

• SCR 1535 (March 2004): establishes the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), with a real staff and a mandate
• Establishes a ‘plenary’ of all SC members as members of CTC
• SG Annan chooses Spanish Ambassador Ruperez as Exective Director of CTED
• But from June 2004-2006, staff still only temporary
• Missions are undertaken to three states in March

UN and Big World Politics at CTC

• Dilemma of Russian Chair of CTC in autumn of 2004
• The weight of the rift between the US and the UN, Iraq, etc
• The emergence of the Danes as CTC chair, April 1, 2005
• How to deal with the malaise that has set in, and the view that the CTC has been by-passed by events

What events and trends?

• The strength and commitment of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations to counter-terror operations
• The emergence of the OECD’s Financial Action Task Force (1989: FATF) in itself and as a model for revamping the CTC
• membership: 31 states & territories, 2 regional organizations (European Commission & Gulf Co-operation Council) and relations with another 50 (2007)
• Some other models – like an ‘IAEA’ for finances and immigration suggested

What is then left for the CTC & the UN?

• Define the mission of a CTC/CTED
• Develop proactive coordination and really institutionalize the ‘switchboard’ function, thus conducting through the CTED credible needs assessments and effective assistance missions. (Check our Matrix)
• Spark inter-agency coordination, linking development with such assistance - CTAG