bin Laden and Al-Qaeda
Picking our brains on bin Laden (OBL) and al-Qaeda
What do we know about bin Laden (OBL) and what does it mean for defense against terrorism?
Myths
- Osama is on kidney dialysis
- Al-Qaeda is obsessed with suicide terror (it's just a successful strategy in their view)
Truths
- Al-Qaeda network is not financed from personal funds but other people's money
- Osama has survived and become a symbol
- Tapes: influence public opinions
- Osama knows what he is doing
Life as a "freedom fighter"
What was this about???
Osama focused on financing and organizing the fight against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. He presented himself as an Afghan war hero even though he was not involved in actual fighting.
OBL’s Post-anti-Soviet experience
Very mixed and some alternative opportunities:
- in Saudi Arabia (SA): his extended contacts and financing of ‘brother’ organizations (Hezbollah; Egyptian Islamic Jihad) lead him to be ‘immobile’ from 1989-91
- 1991-93 – he engages in lots of financing of emigration, violent groups, ‘radical’ clerics… Moves to Sudan and develops a commitment to transnational resistance to the US presence in the Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia
OBL’s Sudan experience
- Solidifies al-Qaeda in a transnational ‘magnet’ in the sense of… and in training; his activities also show his targets (US, Saudi Arabia (SA)…) the importance of a ‘state sponsor’
- In hindsight, it illustrates the on-again, off-again zeal of the West (as well as SA and Egypt) which keeps bringing them ‘close’ to getting him but never actually catching him.
The Return to Afghanistan
OBL moves to Afghanistan. His experience during the early phase of his stay there may actually have led to disintegration of his movement/organization except for:
- Aid and linkage to Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI);
- Rapprochement with Egyptian Islamic Jihad;
- Success of various ‘missions’ which place the tensions between ‘Arab’ jihadists and Taliban in perspective for all of them;
- Western inattention to both Taliban and al-Qaeda.
Key differences from all past terror organizations:
- Transnational mix of recruits (breaking the cultural prejudices of Islamic purity), support networks and serious expertise (e.g.: chemists)
- Special commitment to search for elite trainees and specialists in weapons systems and the ability to buy underpaid specialists
- Relentless search for weapons to develop and/or purchase (including WMDs), especially ABCs
- Compromise strategy and style to permit the center stage for the surrogate state (has the diplomatic skills to get the state support without having to overthrow the government: Sudan; Afghanistan)
Is the goal always to attack US in the US?
It is a means towards an end: to overthrow the regimes of Saudi Arabia,…. The US is a target because of its support for the Saudi royal family for example. Thus, attacking the US is a secondary issue
Osama Bin Laden’s Fatwas:
- 1996 "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places"
- 1998 Fatwa Urging Jihad Against Americans
Fatwas can only be made by clerics - it is an interpretation of the Koran taking into account the current socio-political realities.
The only strong reaction against Osama’s issuing of fatwas, even though he’s not a cleric, came from Iran, which accused him of blasphemy and hoped that true believers will kill him. However, this did not happen, indicating that his message resonates with at least some of the believers.
How successful is the post 9-11 attack on al-Qaeda?
- CRS Report for Congress (2003; 2004)
- White House: National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006)
- PBS: Hunting bin Laden
- Rogers (2006): “Al-Qaeda’s new terrain”
What do we mean by al-Qaeda ‘decentralizing’, ‘morphing’ or becoming a social movement?
A historical analysis of al-Qaeda’s evolution sees it moving from:
- 1991-94: hierarchical (centralized)
- transnational network (decentralized) - it is clear that in this form it has become most effective
- social movement - following the al-Qaeda inspiration
Are there forces that are trying to swing the pendulum away from radical fundamentalism? - political nonviolent engagement
Al-Qaeda After the Taliban and Osama?
- Taliban: see al-Qaeda as a liability
- greatest support for al-Qaeda comes from within Pakistan’s secret service (ISI)
Relationship of the al-Qaeda reality to our analysis of it?
- What terms and perspectives prevail?
- What is the importance of bin Laden? What is really important is that we haven’t managed to break the network in Pakistan that protects and supports al-Qaeda - this is the key for future counter-terrorism success.
- What does it mean to characterize al Qaeda as a social movement? We link everything to al-Qaeda still - monolithical thinking as we were doing before 9-11
- Media reporting: ‘today’s attack is likely the work of…’ - how can you substantiate this claim?
How do we know if we are winning the ‘war’ against al-Qaeda, or any other organization using terror tactics?
- Winning the war against al-Qaeda - how do you measure it?
- no recent attacks
- attacks happen but you get more information that helps prevent future such attacks
- Will terror disappear in all places?
- Will fundamentalist terror disappear?
- What are some good behavioral indicators of progress in combating terrorism?
- Is the world more insecure now than during the Cold War’s nuclear standoff?
- Communism was seen as monolithic - explains US’s drawn out war in Vietnam
- Military dynamic: (a) nuclear proliferation; (b) deterrence - thru mutual assured destruction doctrine (MAD) --> arms race
- Thus, take the long view and remember the lessons of history:
- Iraq = Vietnam - set of decisions that got you into both wars was the same - needed to manufacture something to mobilize the US into getting into the wars, because there was no democratic way to do it otherwise
Good sources for continuing education:
- Council of Foreign Relations
- South Asia Terrorism Portal
- Various news organizations: BBC, Aljazeera, Dawn
- Books:
- Benjamin Barber: Jihad vs. McWorld
- Rohan Guaranta: Inside Al-Qaeda
- John Cooley: Unholy Wars
- Peter Bergen: Holy War, Inc
- Mark Juergensmeyer: Terror in the Mind of God
- Richard Minter: Losing Bin Laden
- Jessica Stern: Terror in the Name of God
- Graham Fuller: The Future of Political Islam






















