Lecture 2 Notes

Understanding 21st Century Terrorism:  A Primer

Themes For Conceptualizing Terrorism

1. History matters: the ‘decades of terror’ of an earlier era
2. Definitional debate has always been deeply imbedded into the discussion of terrorism
3. 1. Regarding actor-act linkage: ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’
   2. Defining ‘causes’ in an idiosyncratic or global scope
   3. Assessing the place (and the role) of the state
4.   The more transnational the terror, the greater the scope of transnational control…that is, the spread of the problem solidified resolve to deal with it via global governance
5. Until recently the majority (but not all) of terrorism has been within the dual target modus vivendi…that is – there is an instrumental (innocent) target that is damaged, threatened, “terrorized” in order to extract concessions from the primary, political target.  In such a system, threat, bargaining and uncertainty are important.
6. Operationally, then, terrorism’s goal was…
   
   • To force a crisis/confrontation w/authorities and extract concessions and to ‘win’ power;
   • To achieve publicity and reap its impact;
   • To provoke repressive counter-terrorism by a national government
   • To punish a ‘guilty’ party (through terror means, e.g. kidnap a relative; kill an associate)
7. Thus, our themes
8. • A mini-history of post-1945 terror
   • Defining terrorism…..
   • Dealing with the role/place of the state
   • How the history and contours of terror have led to an international terror control regime
   • How do we assess whether the attack of 9-11 and/or al-Qaeda are a logical extension of past terror, or new in kind?
9. All of which sets us up for the really interesting questions which permeate the rest of our semester…

History/themes on Terror in the 20thCent.:

• 18th Cent.: French Revolution – real origin of the Jacobin Reign of Terror (oddly ‘state’ terror) – 17,000 killed.
• 19th Cent.:
  

1. intellectuals – Anarchists
2. US experience – Vigilantism

• 20th Cent (pre-45) Balkans and Russia.  The ‘century of Sarajevo’ contrasts non-governmental terror (the Serbian nationalist who assassinates the Archduke in 1914 and sparks WWI) with state terror (the Serbs slaughter of Bosnians in Srebrenica in 1995) State terror has other names & forms:  genocide, politicide, gross violations of human rights
• Three dominant Cases of post-WWII Terrorism
• • Ireland – of course pre-45 as well – in the drive to Irish independence, etc.  Then the emergence of (religious) factionalism
  • The success of the Algerian ‘revolution’ (1954-1962)
  • Middle East/Israel & Palestine

1. The Stern Gang & the Irgun: 1944 – 49
2. Palestinian Revolution/War/Resistance

• • 1960s…..Palestinian Council takes new view after Arab states lose 1967 war
• In addition – lots of ‘terrorism’ unfolding as local violence between those challenging the state and the state itself:
  • Look at the list
  • 1st decade of terror: 1968–78.  Europe becomes Middle East’s battleground:
    1. Increase in air hijacking with peak in 1969: most by Palestinians seeking release of co-nationals from Israeli prisons or to publicize their cause, leads to changes in international law (Tokyo Convention – 1963; Hague Convention – 1970; Montreal Convention – 1971)
    2. Munich Olympics (1972): one of the big events where a Palestinian group took hostage and killed many of the Israeli Olympic team – same motivations
  • 2nd decade of terror: 1978-88. 
    • More in the Middle East itself
    •  Rise of state support:

•  

  Who were the terrorists of 1st decade (1968–78)?

  What led to their development?

  • Pre-eminence of local conditions
  • Notability of ideology
  • •  nihilism
    •  Marxism
    •  fascism
  • Age Profile: primarily between 18 and 35
  • Their “rise” related to three ‘Ts’:
  • • telecommunications
    • technology
    • toleration
  • Examples of Groups  and States:
  • • Tupamaros – Uruguay
    • Monteneros, ERP – Argentina
    • M-19 – Colombia
    • Shining Path – Peru
    • Tamil Tigers – Sri Lanka
    • Japanese Red Army
    • IRA & Provos – N. Ireland
    • ETA – Basque country, Spain
    • Baader-Meinhof Gang – West Germany
    • Red Army Brigades – Italy
    • South Molluccans – Netherlands
    • Utashe - FRY
    • PLO, Black September, PFLP, Fatah – Middle East
    • Hamas, al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Hezbollah
    • FLQ – Quebec
    • Weathermen – USA
    • For more info: http://www.tkb.org/Home.jsp
  • Successful groups had:
  • • Tight ideology and organization
    • Target vulnerability and style of response
    • Limited and achievable goals of [as] a group
    • Deteriorating socio-economic environment
    • Degree of transnational support
    • Good results from activity on all of the above dimensions
  • By 1960s, much of the West defines terrorism as:
  • • Harsh and arbitrary violence which is aimed at civilians and innocents
    • In the context of a non-war situation
    • When the violence of, or threat to violence, clearly is outside of community norms (resistance & war complicates this)
    • And which seeks to extract concessions or benefits from political actors which it cannot achieve otherwise
  • The contested parts of the debate:
  • • New Violence: The level and type of violence used by the terror group must be contrasted with the violence which permeates the society or situation as used by others – especially the state
    • The New Revolution: Terrorism is the strategy of revolution by new means – and includes a competition for the hearts and minds of the undecided
    • Targets: Those in states which use other forms of terrorism, such as repression, as well as their internal and external supporters are legitimate targets (i.e. a version of the claim that there are no innocents)
  • Global Legislation.  The global dialogue on terrorism is dominated by the West through the 1960s and thus the ‘legislation’ controlling and condemning terrorism (UNGA and UNSC resolutions, new conventions) have a western flavor to them:
  • • 1960s: success in reducing air hijacking & airport attacks
    • 1970s: success protecting diplomats
  • Results of Anti-Terror International Cooperation
  • International control and cooperation worked to reign in terrorists groups.  This global effort combined with the changing conditions in the local environment, especially the decline in popularity of groups, led to the demise of these groups, save for situations of foreign occupation – contrast:
  • • ETA 
    • IRA
    • with the PLO official websites:  UN, PLO, MIPT Database
  • And the level of violence and style of actions were still limited and within a ‘code’ of a bargaining model:
  • • 1971: multi-plane hijacking, but no deaths
    • local population critique of excessive violence had an effect
    • local judicial processes were willing to take risks and get convictions
  • However, serious definitional debate still persists:
  • • How much is ‘criminal acts’ in any apolitical sense vs. political crime
    • Is (should) the definition be tied to the act itself, or to the intention of the actor?
    • Can the state be a terrorist?
    • If the state is a terrorist, how can those who respond to its actions be labeled as terrorists?
    • Does where you stand vary with where you sit?

   

  2nd decade of terror: 1978-88

  • The Iranian Hostage Crisis: 1979-81 Confronts the west, esp. the US, with the undeniable realities of state terror
  • Opens the floodgates regarding variations of state support for such acts
  • Some of these analyses combine with new US (Reagan) Administration’s foreign policy goals and interpretations
  • And then the attack on the marines’ barracks in Beirut (1982) fully introduces the US to such terrorism (a good development of this theme in a Bill Moyers news film)
  • Post-1981, terrorism inseparable from:
  • • The patterns of violence and search for peace in the Middle East
    • But added to that is the strategy of transnational Islam gone “radical”
    • The problem of ‘rogue’ states who challenge a western world view and law
    • The disintegration of states such as Sudan, Somalia, and Afghanistan, becoming havens for such activities
    • International crime, corruption, and the search for “prohibited materials”
  •  By late 1980s, state support for terrorism moves to become a state surrogate for war and the use of terrorism as war by other means…
  • Key Conflicts:
  1. U.S.A. vs. Libya, culminating with the Lockerbie disaster as a defining moment for the US – learns that adventurism in foreign policy has paybacks & that states can and will hide terrorists
  2. Russia vs. Chechnya
  3. Israel vs. Palestinians
  • States “choose” Terror or Sponsor a terror group to execute its foreign policy because:
  • • It is cheaper in resources expended and battle loses
    • Up until recently, large states respond[ed] not with conventional force but similar acts (so, ‘YES’ the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon war is very different from the norm)
    • Thus, it avoids general defeat
    • Weapons of mass destruction might make for equalization of force
  • The unfinished agenda of the 1990s:
  • • An internationally accepted definition of terrorism
    • Renunciation of mass murder and the use of WMD (including access issues here as well)
    • Classify and act on the gradations of state involvement
    • Use economic means of coercing states not to support terror
    • How to deal with ‘failed’ states
    • You can’t prevent, only control
  • After the double attacks on US embassies (1998) and the first WTC bombing (1993):
  • • National intelligence needs
    • Concern for the changing of the rules on bargaining and loss of lives
    • How to protect precious domestic facilities
    • New sense of targeting U.S. abroad
    • The Israelization of U.S. attitudes toward response
  • And along comes bin Laden, who:
  • • Has resources to use cost-mix favorably
    • Has a safe haven and an existing network to supply weapons, recruits
    • Then develops state-network relations so that the former is beholding to the latter
    • Has powerful ideology; mastery of the cell system gone transnational
    • Uses well ‘conditions of the people’ throughout the Islamic world
    • Sees inflicting massive damage as the goal
    • Seeks weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
  • How serious is this threat compared to others we have faced? 
  • Does it demand extraordinary methods? 
  • What kind of measures and methods are most useful?
  • What are the dangers of some methods over others?
  • Are those who worry about the ethics or legality of the methods just weenies?
  • How and where do considerations of peace enter into the dialogue about what to do about terrorism, or more pointedly, how we (should) discuss the global ‘war on terror’?